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 1 
Emergencies in Sober Hobbesianism 
Tom Sorell 
 
Thomas Hobbes might seem an unlikely source for a theory of emergency powers 
applicable to liberal democracies in our own day. He advocated the concentration of 
political, judicial, economic and military authority, and was in favour of great latitude 
for a monarch or assembly in the choice of means to security.  His theory demands 
absolute submission to law on the part of citizens, with no constitutional limitations 
on what laws can require.1 The same theory demands preventive measures against 
sedition, and has a very expansive conception of seditious behavior. What is more, 
the concentration of power with wide discretion is supposed to be politics as usual.  
 
What ties these elements together is the idea that social life for human beings is 
always potentially incendiary. The default condition of human beings living 
ungoverned in groups is war –cold or hot—and the primary purpose of government 
is to act against the causes of war in human behavior and human circumstances. For 
Hobbes, communal human life is the permanent possibility of emergency, and the 
duties and powers of government are fundamentally to do with the pre-emption of 
emergency. They are not to do with the distribution of goods that permit each of us 
to pursue respectworthy life plans or choices. They are not to do with equipping 
people for the local pursuit of human flourishing. They are not to do with the 
fulfilment of human rights. They are for keeping a people safe from one another and 
from conquest. 
 
Although there are problems with applying the unexpurgated Hobbes to the 
demands of modern terrorism and civil war, a toned-down but recognizable version 
of the theory does lend itself to these kinds of violent challenges to state power. 
‘Sober Hobbesianism’ is my term for the toned down theory. According to me, this 
form of Hobbesianism gives security great weight while at the same time limiting the 
legal repression that is sometimes proposed in the name of security during 
emergencies. Instead of tracing war to simple difference of opinion, and common or 
garden self-love, sober Hobbesianism traces war to disagreements in which there 
are fundamentalist attachments to a point of view or way of life or a person or place.  
A fundamentalist attachment is an attachment to something one would rather kill or 
be killed for than lose. Sober Hobbesianism criminalizes certain expressions of 
fundamentalist attachments, and limits pretexts both for violence and for departures 
from a normal legal order, simulating some of the features of a liberal order. 
 
From unreconstructed Hobbes to Sober Hobbesianism 
 
I have previously explained how to get from unreconstructed Hobbes to sober 
Hobbesianism.2 The main working parts of unreconstructed Hobbesanism are (1) a 
theory of how human beings naturally and pre-scientifically arrive at the valuations 
                                                        
1 There are natural law limitations which a sovereign power can ignore if abiding by them would 
endanger public security. 
2 Emergencies and Politics  (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2015), chs.2 and 3. 
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of things they pursue or avoid; (2) the postulation of a so-called “right of nature”; (3) 
an argument about how (1) and (2) combine to produce general violent conflict 
when people pursue a thing they cannot both have; and (4) a theory of how violent 
conflict and its bad byproducts can be avoided in the long term. I now briefly enlarge 
on (1)-(4). 
 
 (1) According to Hobbes, people naturally tend to regard as good what produces 
immediate pleasure, and to count as bad what produces pain or displeasure. 
Different people are differently constituted and have different accumulated sensory 
experiences, and these, as well as rhetoric, account for differences in valuations. 
People who are able to reflect on pursuing the immediately pleasurable and avoiding 
the immediately painful can sometimes get enough detachment from their appetites 
and aversions to judge that even painful things are good on balance, e.g. because of 
their long-term good consequences.  
 
This sort of detachment is the beginning of a science of good and evil –that is, a 
theory that distinguishes between prima facie goods and goods all-things-
considered. Although people can learn from experience to distinguish between 
apparent and real goods, they can also learn from scientific demonstrations of the 
good and bad effects of different corporeal things on humans and the good and bad 
effects of different courses of action. But many people never get even to the stage of 
reflecting on their own scheme of apparent goods and are at the mercy of their 
habits of pursuit or avoidance. They may also be swayed by the preferences of those 
who are powerful or admired –sometimes through persuasive speech—or refine 
their patterns of pursuit or avoidance by a more or less uncritical imitation. Either 
way, they are likely to end up in the competitive and even violent pursuit of 
whatever appeals to them. 
 
(2) There is no objective criterion for what to pursue and how to pursue it if the good 
itself is no more than a matter of what individuals have an appetite for. Until people 
agree on, or submit to, imposed common standards, they are naturally entitled to be 
their own uncritical judges of what to pursue or avoid. Or, in other words, they have 
the right to be their own judges of ends and means, especially where others are apt 
to pursue their own ends ruthlessly. This is what Hobbes calls the “right of nature”. 
 
(3) The right of nature permits violent people to pursue things violently. But it also 
gives peaceful and accommodating people a reason to pre-empt the violence of 
violent people by violence of their own. In fact, the right of nature gives everyone –
of whatever temperament—the right to lie, kill and maim if they are not to become 
the victims of deception, physical injury or murder themselves.  In other words, the 
right of nature permits and, on some natural additional assumptions, even requires, 
people to interact violently. The additional assumptions are that some people 
pursue their own ends violently, and that these may be hard to tell apart from the 
reasonable and accommodating until it is too late—until one has learnt the hard way 
that they will stop at nothing. In other words, so long as each retains the right of 
nature and is guided by their own appetites and aversions, each is at war with every 
other person living locally. 
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(4) Hobbes’s answer to war of all against all is a simultaneous mass transfer by each 
of the right of nature to a third party who is to decide for them all what courses of 
action they must each follow.  This third party becomes sovereign on accepting the 
transfer, and understands that the purpose of the transfer is to deliver all from war. 
The reason the mass transfer of the right of nature can in principle make sense to 
otherwise distrustful parties is that everyone has an aversion to death, and war 
hastens death. What is more, since war results from a plurality of wills spurred by a 
plurality of apparent goods, the reduction of wills to one is already a peace-
promoting measure.  Again, since people may revoke the transfer if the sovereign’s 
will reignites war or threatens lives in other ways, it is not absolutely binding.  
 
The mass simultaneous transfer of right is accomplished by a speech act. Each of the 
many promises not to be his own judge of ends and means if, for the sake of peace, 
others promise the same. The person to whom the right of judging ends and means 
is passed is some third party external to the mutual promising. It could be an 
individual (corresponding to the case of monarchy) or a council. This person accepts 
to be the judge, and his or her choice of ends and means are embodied in a system 
of public precepts and prohibitions intelligible as the legislation of a sovereign 
power. For subjects, abiding by the mutual promise is a matter of abstaining from 
practical judgement on matters pronounced upon by law.  Or, as Hobbes puts it, 
abiding by the mutual promise is a matter of absolute submission to the sovereign. 
The only just ground of release from submission is an actual threat to one’s life –
either from the sovereign or from non-co-operating subjects. 
 
The sovereign’s free hand as legislator is likely to repel liberals. If the sovereign 
declares a curfew at sunset, or makes it compulsory for each householder to put 
bars on windows, then, so far as Hobbes’s political philosophy is concerned, the 
sovereign is entirely within his rights to do so.  The sovereign accepts the transfer of 
the right of nature so as to legislate for peace, and a law establishing a curfew or 
requiring bars on windows is intelligible as a peace-keeping measure.  Suppose that 
the sovereign declares alcohol-consumption illegal, on the ground that people who 
get drunk are a mortal danger to one another? That, too, is a legislative option for 
the sovereign. So also, to name measures on the English legislative agenda in the 
1620s, is a tax that raises money for building a naval fleet, or a law requiring citizens 
to billet soldiers. 
 
Peace-keeping, in short, can involve far-reaching and burdensome measures, the 
only restriction on them being their intelligibility to a sovereign as means of 
domestic security or security from conquest. If the sovereign sincerely but 
irrationally believes that his realm is under threat of invasion by creatures from 
another planet, and that emitting radio signals of a certain frequency is a counter-
measure, then lavish spending on radio transmitters, too, is entirely legitimate, 
according to Hobbes. Of course the more bizarre the measure the less effective it is 
likely to be, and the more short-lived the sovereign’s authority when his security 
measures fail in practice. Still, the fact that so much depends on the sovereign’s 
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fallible human judgement, and that it may sometimes please the sovereign to be 
gratuitously repressive, means that sovereignty can easily be misused.  
 
One safeguard against that misuse is recourse by the sovereign to a science of 
rulership, such as Hobbes provided in his three treatises on sovereignty. Another is a 
deep psychological identification of the sovereign with the interests of his subjects, 
exactly what Hobbes calls for in Leviathan ch. 30. But since there is no challenging 
the sovereign’s judgement from within a commonwealth –that would be for a 
subject or subjects to take back the right of nature—and since even the science or 
counsel that the sovereign consults may be incorrectly disregarded, the scope for 
uselessly extreme restrictions on people’s liberty is great.  
 
The problem is made worse by three kinds of exaggeration in Hobbes’s theories of 
war and the antidote to war: (a) He sets the threshold for war-provoking 
disagreement far too low. In his earliest political treatise, where sovereignty is 
connected with reducing many wills to one, he writes as if whenever practical 
judgement is distributed, it is plagued by indecision and perhaps even faction leading 
to war. This is behind his unofficial favoritism of monarchy over other constitutional 
forms. Relatedly, the unreconstructed Hobbes saw the seeds of all- out conflict in 
ordinary disagreement, academic disputation, and the speeches or publications of 
powerful people whose self-love made them feel under-rated. Laws against even 
small scale public disputes or self-aggrandizing personal publicity would have been 
for him quite natural measures for the sovereign to implement.  
 
(b) The second exaggeration is to do with the permanent latency of all-out war in 
human nature, and the supposition that it is just below the surface in the behaviour 
of even a law-abiding citizenry. Hobbes often writes as if government is a permanent 
effort at stifling dispositions to engage in violence that are never eradicated. For 
example, he often implies that widespread public challenges to the sovereign power 
would immediately reinstate the war of all against all, with all its dangers, as if 
customs of civility and non-aggression developed in the possibly very long intervals 
between periods of civil war would instantly crumble. In other words, he seems to 
under-rate the force of customs of peace and civility. 
 
To uncover the third exaggeration, it is necessary to point out that Hobbes gives no 
eligibility conditions for the role of the third party who accepts to be sovereign in the 
state of nature: presumably it could be anyone; yet it is essential for good 
sovereignty that the person who takes on that role identify with a whole people who 
submit to him. It is essential that is, that the third party subordinate the interests of 
the individual he is to the interests of the many. But this generates a dilemma. Either 
detachment from one’s own interests is possible for any individual naturally, in 
which case detachment, rather than submission, may be the peace-making measure 
par excellence; or else detachment is not naturally possible, in which case there is a 
big gap in Hobbes’s picture of the recipient of the mass transfer of the right of 
nature. Hobbes wants to say that the normal inability of people to behave 
reflectively and to see their interests as only some among many are a cause of war, 
but (c) –and here we come to the third exaggeration--he overstates the difficulty of 
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achieving detachment, and so implies that there are after all eligibility conditions for 
being the receiving third party in the mass transfer of the right of nature. 
 
I think the only way out of this dilemma is for Hobbes to concede that detachment is 
achievable but difficult for individual human beings. But this opens the possibility of 
a democracy composed of those who are capable of detachment, a democracy with 
no need to transfer the right of nature.  It also opens the possibility for each 
individual of telling real from apparent goods, and of counting as real goods more 
than peace, including e.g. the good of unaggressively leading one’s own life.   
 
Sober Hobbesianism is unreconstructed Hobbes minus the exaggerations. It is in the 
permissiveness of the legal regime of the unreconstructed Hobbes and in the low 
threshold that human behavior has to reach to count as aggressive that we 
encounter the main sources of overstatement. These are the elements which sober 
Hobbesianism addresses.In relation to exaggeration (a), sober Hobbesianism implies 
that collective practical judgement is not sufficient for indecision, particularly when 
people exercise detachment from their own interests, or relatively narrow collective 
interests. Sober Hobbesianism undoes Hobbes’s obsession with unitary sovereign 
judgement. The requirements of communal security can be judged by a plurality of 
agents, so long as their procedures for overseeing security are adequate to reaching 
impartial decisions speedily.  
 
More generally, and again contrary to unreconstructed Hobbesianism, only some 
disagreements are precursors of all-out war.  Foremost among these are 
disagreements arising from what I have previously called fundamentalist 
attachments.3 These are non-negotiable attachments to purposes or people or 
objects, attachments that people would rather be killed or kill for than lose. Even 
these have to become very contagious in order credibly to provoke a war of all 
against all, but there are conceivable counter-cultural fundamentalist attachments 
that might attract such a backlash.  
 
How does sober Hobbesianism deal with exaggeration (b)?  It implies that the 
longer-lived a stable government is, the less likely it is that subjects refrain from 
violence merely because they are forced to, and the less likely it is, consequently, 
that they will immediately revert to violence in a general emergency.  Sober 
Hobbesianism gives weight to the transmission of practices of civility and is open to 
the establishment of institutions that inculcate these practices. 
 
Again, and now coming to exaggeration (c), sober Hobbesianism implies that people 
can reflect on and maybe revalue downwards things that they habitually pursue.  It 
implies that people can reflect and revalue downwards the value something has in 
virtue of satisfying their interests.  Crediting people with the ability to gain 
detachment even about personal interests, sober Hobbesianism makes room for 
personal autonomy consistent with communal security.  
 
                                                        
3 Emergencies and Politics, pp. 40ff 
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The liberalism in sober Hobbesianism 
Sober Hobbesianism is a variety of liberalism. It promotes the autonomy of self-
critical pursuers of a variety of goods, so long as these goods do not endanger life.  It 
assumes that citizens have reflective capacities and that they are not at the mercy of 
their strongest desires and aversions.  It assumes that people can be moved by what 
is in anyone’s interest, and not only by what is good for themselves. But it also gives 
great weight to the protection of life and freedom from injury, and it calls for 
institutions designed to secure these things. In other words, it values security. Sober 
Hobbesianism recalls the unreconstructed Hobbes not in making security the 
organizing value of communal life, but in making security of life the over-arching 
constraint on the organizing value: namely, the exercise by anyone of autonomy.   
 
In my earlier working out of the theory,4 I looked to Raz for the elements of the kind 
of liberalism I was looking for.  His Morality and Freedom outlines a liberalism geared 
to autonomy, and associates that with a kind of practical reasoning that is reflective. 
Raz’s theory further recommended itself in view of (1) its connecting individual 
reasons for action with reasons for the existence of institutions; (2) its theory of a 
right grounded in an interest in aspects of well-being; (3) its recognition that the 
autonomous pursuit of well-being depends on stable, non-violent social forms, some 
independent of state institutions; (4) its recognition of the right to life as a 
fundamental right; and (5) its claim that conditions of autonomy involve internal 
critical and reasoning capacities that both individuals and the state have duties not 
to reduce and even to  enhance.5 These capacities are of the kind needed in 
autonomous agents to counteract unreasoned fundamentalisms, and indeed all 
fundamentalisms.6 
 
The three most important requirements of practical rationality from a sober 
Hobbesian point of view are (1) the ability to detach oneself from one’s appetites 
and ask whether there are reasons for satisfying them independently of the force of 
appetite or aversion itself; (2) the ability to see one’s own appetites and aversions as 
only some among others distributed among all of the people one lives with or near; 
and (3) the ability to see that the satisfaction of appetites now or soon is not 
necessarily better than their satisfaction later. These abilities enable one to criticize 
and even weaken the associated appetites, and therefore to make decisions without 
being at the mercy of appetites. They can also make it possible to weaken the effect 
of appetite that conflicts with being law-abiding, and aversion to doing what the law 
asks. In short, critical abilities in each person can make it possible for people to think 
about law in the more impartial way that Hobbes associates with sovereignty. Not 
just law but public policy allows for this approach. Instead of thinking for others 
without their appetites and identifying with their interests in survival and prosperity 
– as a sovereign is supposed to – one thinks for oneself, but without being carried 
away by the fact that some of the appetites calling for satisfaction are one’s own. 
Instead, some common denominator reachable by detachment comes to put 
different appetites and aversions on a level.  
                                                        
4 Emergencies and Politics,  ch. 4 
5 Here I adapt a little the formulation in Emergencies and Politics, p. 60. 
6 The following five paragraphs are drawn from Emergencies and Politics,  pp. 71-74. 
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Points (1) – (3) do not have counterparts in every form of liberalism. Different 
varieties of liberalism carry with them differing conceptions of practical rationality, 
and not all versions of liberalism seem to give the same value to the capacity for 
detachment from and critical reflection on appetite and passionately felt loyalties. In 
the same way, not all versions of liberalism give weight to institutions or policies that 
encourage critical reflection. Since the passionately felt loyalties counteracted by 
personal critical reflection can include those that generate fundamentalism, not all 
versions of liberalism pre-empt or counteract fundamentalism. Not all versions of 
liberalism, for that matter, make much of other capacities for self-restraint, such as 
the capacity to forgo fattening food, or to forgo purchases until one has saved the 
money needed to pay for them.7Although liberalism implies that life within the state 
should to the greatest degree possible be determined by private choice, liberals 
disagree over whether private choices are to be respected regardless of how they 
are arrived at, or whether they ought to be informed, self-critical, objectively in the 
interest of the chooser, or all three.  
 
Liberals also disagree over whether, and, if so, when, the state has a role in 
improving the outcomes of private choice by restricting liberties or excluding certain 
choices by force. The difference between Hobbes’s own position  and liberal 
positions is partly to do with whether coercion by the state is a first or last resort in 
the response to peace-disturbing free expression or free association. But the 
difference is also connected with the character of the threats regarded by each 
position as the most urgent to prevent. Hobbes tended to worry most about sedition 
– exercises of freedom intended to, or with the potential to, destabilize government. 
Neo-Hobbesianism emphasises the danger from projects or attachments on which 
people are willing to stake their lives.8 These attachments can lead to violence 
without the violence leading to the overthrow of government.  
 
Mill and other liberals concerned with tolerance sometimes worry about officious 
intervention and its limits. Should I prevent someone walking on a bridge that is 
about to collapse? Yes, Mill says, if he is unaware of the condition of the bridge: the 
high risk of harm makes the intervention justifiable. Other cases are less easy to 
decide. Should I do or say something if two people in a bus I am riding on have a 
loud conversation in which they express strongly racialist sentiments? Differently, 
should I do or say anything if two people on a crowded public beach at midday 
decide to have sex? For the most part I set aside questions about personal 
interventions in non-life threatening situations and concentrate on interventions by 
the state. Many jurisdictions have laws against having sex in public places, and some 
punish expressions of racial hatred without necessarily criminalizing one-off 
outbursts on buses.  
 
                                                        
7 For a theory that does, see William Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Duties in the 
Liberal State (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
8 Neo-Hobbesianism is a position intermediate between unreconstructed and sober Hobbesianism. 
See Emergencies and Politics, pp. 50ff. It postulates the possibility of widely distributed capacities for 
self-critical practical reason, but retains security as the organizing goal of the state. 
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Since my argument against the unreconstructed Hobbes is to the effect that practical 
rationality in each of the many and not just the sovereign can tell against violence 
and the ruthless pursuit of self-interest, against sedition and against other sources of 
harm, including public harm, I am interested in versions of liberalism that concede 
that personal choice is sometimes defective. I am interested in versions that also 
insist that personal choice can and should be improved, if possible by agents 
themselves, but, failing that, with the help of state institutions. This is a modestly 
perfectionist position.  
 
The perfectionism in liberalism with Hobbesian sobriety implies that the answer to 
the possibility of large-scale violent conflict is not the delegation of all powers of 
control to a sovereign but the cultivation of personal powers of detachment as a 
basis for restraint, tolerance and co-operation, and, where these give out or fail to 
be formed, the introduction by democratic means of coercive laws that prevent the 
violent pursuit of particular goals. A modestly perfectionist liberalism with 
Hobbesian sobriety differs from neo-Hobbesianism by making the use of public 
coercion conditional on the failure of self-imposed norms of conflict prevention. By 
making coercion a last resort, it breaks from Hobbesianism – neo- or 
unreconstructed.   
 
Can Raz’s form of liberalism, which is in tune with unreconstructed Hobbesianism up 
to a point, which is in tune up to a point also with the perfectionist version of neo-
Hobbesianism, also address problems raised by fundamentalist attachments? If 
liberalism came with scepticism about the very category of non-negotiable goods, 
and if it developed institutions for calling into question claims that particular values 
were worth fighting or dying for within a liberal state, then its anti-fundamentalism 
might be beyond question. But liberalism itself sometimes seems to contain a 
category of non-negotiable goods – usually implicit in the idea of inalienable rights, 
and liberals of some kinds claim that a failure to respect those rights can justify 
(violent) rebellion even against a state that claims to be liberal.9A Razian theory that 
incorporates Hobbesian insights can address this problem. It can address this 
problem if it adopts the sober Hobbesian diagnosis of fundamentalism as a source of 
harm, and if it retains the idea that rights can exist and yet be limited or overridden. 
The Razian theory can then say both that there is a right to free speech and that it 
can be limited if expressing fundamentalist attachments to certain audiences is likely 
to produce violence. 
 
The doctrine in Morality and Freedom needs to be revised to meet these 
requirements . As it is, its endorsement of strong personal attachments and its 
rejection of choices detached from social forms are sometimes in tension with one 
another or else are overfriendly to fundamentalisms.10 Specifically, its commitment 
to ‘internal critical and reasoning capacities’ is in tension with its tendency to deny 
that we can detach ourselves from social forms: sober Hobbesianism holds that 
social forms can be objects of critical scrutiny and rejection, e.g. when judged by the 
criterion of whether they cause physical injury or shorten biological life.  Social forms 
                                                        
9 See the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
10 Emergencies and Politics, pp. 74ff. 
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might also be judged defective on account of being over conventional or quasi-
ritualized. Raz is wary of adopting points of view on life that are geared to biology 




The anti-fundamentalism of sober Hobbesianism 
Sober Hobbesianism permits a form of liberal democracy, but its liberalism is 
relatively thin. The right to life is fundamental, and securing it can limit other rights 
usually associated with liberalism, including freedoms of speech and association. 
Although the principal purpose of the state is to facilitate the exercise of autonomy 
by individuals, it is to be facilitated only if people pursue their life-plans non-
violently. Non-negotiable attachments to things one is willing to kill for are not 
elements of preferred lifeplans in liberalism. Either the attachments have to admit of 
negotiation, or, if they cannot, the use of violent means to maintain those 
attachments has to be outlawed. For example, attachments to children are often 
non-negotiable, perhaps blamelessly so: that does not mean that court orders 
prohibiting access can blamelessly be fought to the death, or flouted by means of an 
abduction. Sober Hobbesianism is likely to recommend both institutions and social 
forms that discourage non-negotiable attachments, even when they involve 
children.  Sober Hobbesianism is likely, for example, to endorse the existence of 
family courts.  In the form they are known in Western liberal democracies, these 
courts acknowledge the brute strength of attachments to children, while also not 
treating the strength of those attachments as overriding in decisions about custody 
or rights of access. 
 
The case of attachments to children does not set the pattern for how non-negotiable 
attachments in general are treated by sober-Hobbesianism. For one thing, non-
negotiable attachments to children are frequently not contested, and so are not 
asserted violently. They may co-exist perfectly well with public order because they 
underlie normal, privately displayed, parental behavior.11 Hobbes treated religious 
commitments as if they did not have to be displayed to everyone else, either. He 
claimed that attachment to the tenets of the Christian faith was a matter of inner 
belief or disposition not necessarily visible or offensive to others, and going through 
the motions of an approved public worship at variance with one’s beliefs could not 
offend a God who could read inner beliefs. According to Hobbes there was no need 
for people to advertise their faith to one another, not for the purposes of 
redemption and reception into a sought after afterlife.  
 
Keeping faith separate from professions of faith and out of the public eye is yet 
harder where freedom of expression is a right, even if an overridable right, as in a 
sober Hobbesian state. This brings us to the problem of expressing non-negotiable 
attachment to a religion that is claimed to be the one true faith. To address the 
                                                        
11 This possibility of co-existence is not due to the existence of a non-political private order 
constituted by the family. Hobbes was in fact perfectly clear that parents do have power over children 
that is at least analogous to political power. The chapter in Leviathan which addresses this matter is 
called ‘Of Dominion Paternall and Despotical’ 
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problem, the sober Hobbesian state will have to propose institutions and practices of 
education that defuse fundamentalism by making second nature the criticism of  
non-negotiable attachments. These practices will stigmatize dogmatism and 
institutionalize the legitimacy of requests for justification. Appeals to authority, and 
justification by quotation from unchallengeable texts, be they the Koran or Mao’s 
Little Red Book, will be discouraged. Perhaps the methods of secular Anglo-American 
philosophy are adaptable for the purpose of cultivating the appropriate critical 
reflexes. If so, then, contrary to unreconstructed Hobbesianism, philosophical 
disputation about the truth may come to have a use in staving off war, not inviting it. 
 
But education is only part of the story. Sober Hobbesian government must formulate 
in legislation and policy documents criteria under which fundamentalist attachments 
are unacceptably extreme. Unacceptably extreme attachments may include 
attachments to war or violence itself, or to war or violence as non-optional means of 
pursuing something else. Unacceptable expressions of attachments may include not 
only violent assertions of these attachments, but projects of recruitment to groups 
that assert attachments violently. Again, the sober Hobbesian state can criminalize 
action by someone or some group who presumes to be their own judge of the 
reasonableness of their attachments and what can be done to maintain them. 
 
 In other words, the state can limit very severely the things that can justify violence 
or taking life even in the name of things that many people are willing to die for.  
Staying close to its roots, sober Hobbesianism can say that the only thing that 
justifies violence is individual or collective self-defence against the threat of death. 
The threat of death does not mean the threat of death to one’s way of life:12 it is 
biological life that must be threatened. Here sober Hobbesianism is at its most 
Hobbesian.  For it is a hall-mark of unreconstructed Hobbesianism that only the 
sovereign decides what is worth fighting for, and that the primary thing that is 
outlawed with the threat of force is violence, life-threatening violence before all 
other forms. 
 
Recall that my category of fundamentalist attachments was devised to improve on 
Hobbes’s idea that communal human life itself is an emergency waiting to happen. It 
isn’t plausible to claim, as Hobbes does, that appetites in local competitors for things 
that can’t be shared are by themselves a war in the making. After all, the appetites 
could be mild or short-lived or present in unaggressive people. For the same and 
further reasons, it is implausible to claim that factual or theoretical disagreements 
will make people come to blows. It is much more plausible to associate war in the 
making with the existence of widely held, loudly proclaimed, counter-cultural or 
procultural fundamentalism.  
 
Counter-cultural fundamentalism is non-negotiable attachment to values that are 
overwhelmingly ignored or rejected locally, say allegiance to country Y expressed in 
country X, or a commitment to religion X expressed in a place where people are 
overwhelmingly committed to religion Y. To express countercultural fundamentalism 
                                                        
12 See Emergencies and Politics ch. 5. 
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is to send a provocative message to those who participate in what the 
fundamentalists conceive as the majority culture. The message is that the majority 
are attached to the wrong things, and that being attached to those things is 
offensive to those going against the culture, who are not about to defer to that 
culture, and are willing to kill rather than do so. Of course, the message may 
overstate the intentions of the fundamentalists. Or it may fail to outrage more than 
a few of the majority. Nevertheless, one can see that the message might be meant 
to outrage the majority and start a general conflict. In the meantime, the outrage of 
the few against the fundamentalists can lead to killings that in turn engender 
procultural fundamentalist attachments in the majority culture. Or again, procultural 
fundamentalism may grow up unprovoked by counter-cultural fundamentalism –it 
may develop in pockets of local racist sentiment, for example—and again threaten 
violence against up to then peaceful minorities. 
 
If that makes sense, legislation against fundamentalism and its expression might be 
foremost in a body of law with a Hobbesian inspiration, that is, a body of law meant 
primarily to keep the peace. It would not be an afterthought prompted by the 
growth of fundamentalist groups. The sober Hobbesian state would recognize that 
public commitments to die for or kill other than in self-defence directly engage with 
the purpose of the state.13 This is so even when the purpose of the state is not to 
establish security pure and simple but instead  to facilitate the non-violent and non-
lethal exercise of autonomy. Of course, legislation against other, non-fundamentalist 
but potentially lethal crime is also in order from a Hobbesian perspective, but not 
because that crime conveys or is meant to convey an aggressively offensive message 
to a majority population, a message that could incite a civil war. It deserves 
criminalization because of the right to life of the individuals who might be the one-
off victims of lethal crime in an otherwise stable political order. 
 
Criminalization is the means by which, in unreconstructed Hobbesianism, 
government staves off both common or garden crime and civil war. Law in general is 
security law, because the guiding purpose of an unreconstructed Hobbesian state is 
to protect people’s lives and a modest well-being against the ingredients of war in 
communal life. There are no distinctively sweeping and temporarily invoked 
emergency powers that the sovereign has to put on the statute books: the whole 
body of law is supposed to pre-empt emergency. Sober Hobbesianism, by contrast,  
though it does not maintain that the whole body of law is supposed to pre-empt 
emergency, does hold that the body of law is pervaded by security considerations.  
 
Citizens are to be permitted to lead their own lives, but non-violently.  This means 
that they can adopt any of a wide variety of life-plans so long as they abjure 
violence, and so long as their non-violent behavior does not put others at risk of 
injury or death. For example, consider a city dweller who likes to stroll at night 
studying the different types who come out at night in cities. This is a non-violent 
                                                        
13 This is so even, or may be particularly, when fundamentalism is expressed from behind bars by 
people who are behind bars for encouraging people to commit terrorist  offences. The UK 
government has only recently begun to consider the separation of unrepentant prisoners who have 
histories of radicalizing others. This measure is strongly supported by sober Hobbesianism. 
 12 
practice that a certain kind of literary-minded citizen might go in for. Yet In a public 
health emergency, non-violent carriers of a virus might be forcibly quarantined by a 
sober Hobbesian government. This would certainly constrain the life of a dedicated 
but infected flaneur.  Yet the constraint, which is anyway temporary and non-
arbitrary, is justifiable because of the possibly life-threatening harm of the practice 
in those circumstances. Other liberalisms would balk at quarantining the infectious, 
but incorrectly, because of the status of the right to life as fundamental.  
  
 
“Good law” and emergency powers under sober Hobbesianism 
How in general is a sober Hobbesian government to decide when to constrain 
autonomous activity for the sake of security? Here it pays to begin by asking the 
same question of unreconstructed Hobbesianism. Its primary answer is ‘Through 
law’14 but where the sovereign’s framing of law is informed by Hobbes’s concept of a 
good law. (see Leviathan, ch, 30) For a law to be good, it has to be necessary for 
security, not simply a recognizable security measure.  
 
A law taxing people in order to raise money for military weapons would not be 
necessary if it predictably left them so poor that they had to steal or kill to get 
enough to eat. Far from being necessary, the measure would be self-defeating. 
Similarly, an all-night curfew might keep malefactors and their possible victims at a 
safe distance from one another, but if the curfew also interfered with movements of 
food supplies or caused people to feel imprisoned in their own homes and receptive 
to demagoguery intended to make them rise up against this confinement, then, 
again, it would be an invitation to violence rather than a safeguard against it. In a 
different way, a law enabling precautionary personal searches might be unnecessary 
if it were introduced without any evidence that, in the places the searches were 
carried out, people were often hiding dangerous materials or weapons.  
 
Hobbes’s concept of the good law suggests that a balance needs to be struck. On the 
one hand, the legal regime should recognize sources of harmless well-being – a 
reasonably full stomach, family life, unencumbered movement for those minding 
their own business – and allow the many to get on with the enjoyment of these 
things. The many must also have the freedom to work and create the wealth to pay 
for an unavoidable defensive war and routine internal policing. On the other hand, 
the legal regime should snuff out violence as far as possible and restrict whatever 
liberties encourage violence.  
 
Good law calls for two forms of self-restraint on the part of the sovereign. The first is 
the by now familiar restraint of the appetites of the natural person the sovereign is, 
if the sovereign is a monarch, or the natural appetites of the few who are members 
of an assembly, if sovereign is an assembly. The demands of the appetites of the self 
or selves must be subordinated to the security needs of the many. 15Second, the 
sovereign must not think that his opinion alone counts. Though it is worse to be 
                                                        
14 Hobbes also recommends institutions of sovereign-worship and certain educational measures 
15 For elaboration, see my ‘The burdensome freedom of sovereigns’ in T. Sorell and L. Foisneau, eds. 
Leviathan After 350 Years (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 183–196. 
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dependent on too much advice than to use one’s own head as sovereign, best of all 
is to listen to the advice of good counsellors – those who, when asked, give 
dispassionate advice for the sake of public safety.16 In particular, a sovereign ought 
to make use of civil science – that is, read Leviathan or De cive, which Hobbes 
perhaps intended as counsel of a particularly superior, conclusive, kind.17 
 
What ties together these two forms of self-restraint is the way both act against 
personal bias and personal passions and make detached judgement the basis of law. 
On the one hand, in framing laws or policies, the sovereign tries to take the point of 
view of the many he personifies rather than his own personal point of view; on the 
other, he is supposed to form a judgement based on the views of those whose 
experience makes them expert, or on the basis of rigorous reasoning. He is not 
supposed to be guided by mere personal hunches, or by the badly skewed advice of 
a horde of sycophants.  
 
Apart from the sovereign’s self-restraint, what is required in good law is that it be 
effective (actually reduce injury, death and the likelihood of either) and that it be 
impartially applied. A law must be necessary in order to be good, and it cannot be 
necessary if it serves no purpose, or is not fit for its assigned purpose. Furthermore, 
a law or general precept addressed to everyone cannot be a good law if in practice it 
can be violated with impunity by some of its addressees while others always suffer 
its advertised penalties. To put it in Hobbes’s way, a good law must not only be 
necessary but be in keeping with the natural law of equity. 
 
Although many laws that Hobbes counted good are illiberal, there is no  
inconsistency between liberalism and effective and consistently applied law.18 Which 
brings us to the question of emergency powers taken by liberal governments. When 
sober Hobbesianism is supplemented with Hobbes’s conception of a good law, it is 
able to pronounce critically on many emergency measures adopted ad hoc. Leaving 
aside emergency measures prompted by natural disasters, including public health 
emergencies, we can concentrate  on those that have been introduced 
internationally since the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 
2001. Sober Hobbesianism does not, as might be thought, offer carte blanche to 
counter terrorist measures of all kinds. Although its criticisms of these measures are 
only thinly liberal ones, the targets of sober Hobbesianism and the targets of more 
full-blooded liberalism are often the same.  
 
Post 9/11 Security 
The background to both the introduction and criticism of emergency powers is the 
thought that in the post 9/11 world a “new normal” is emerging, that is, a legal 
regime even in liberal democracies appropriate to a prolonged period of emergency. 
It is a regime typified by legislating ad hoc for emergency --within an emergency.  
Appropriating Hobbes’s concept of good law, I shall argue that even when a new 
                                                        
16 See Leviathan, ch. 25, p. 182. 4 See my Hobbes (London: Routledge, 1986), p. 135. 
17 See my Hobbes (London: Routledge, 1986), p. 135 
18 Good law is consistent with liberalism without being inspired by liberal values. See my ‘Law and 
Equity in Hobbes’  
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normal19 is motivated by a concern with security, it is not necessarily acceptable 
from a Hobbesian point of view: for one thing, the new regime may be predictably 
ineffective; for another, the threat it is directed against may not be big enough or 
imminent enough to count as an emergency.20   
 
Surveys of post 9/11 legislation and government action internationally seem to 
reveal at least four trends: (1) an increase in public and covert surveillance in liberal 
democratic states;21 (2) ad hoc revision of the law in certain liberal democratic states 
to limit protections for suspects in counter-terrorism investigations;22(3) exploitation 
by liberal democratic state security services of investigatory practices and detention 
in illiberal states;23and (4) opportunistic uses by illiberal states of counter-terrorism 
as a pretext for illiberal measures directed at ordinary citizens of those states. I shall 
focus first on (2). It is exemplified by legal measures introduced in the US and the UK 
to provide for prolonged and even indefinite periods of detention without charge for 
suspects in counter-terrorism cases. It is also exemplified by the creation ad hoc of 
special tribunals to try such suspects, tribunals operating under unusual rules, and by 
attempts to deport foreign counter-terrorist suspects to human rights-abusing, and 
in particular jus cogens-violating, jurisdictions. Sometimes such measures involve 
derogations from human rights treaties, as in the UK government derogation from 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), Article 5, in November 2001.   
 
Can (2) be justified? Clearly a liberal justification is difficult or impossible to mount, 
particularly when human rights protections, such as those codified by the ECHR, and 
the UK counterpart of that Convention, the Human Rights Act (1998), have 
something like the force of Constitutional provisions. Is it any easier to mount a 
sober Hobbesian defence? That depends on how Hobbesianism bears on ad hoc 
revisions of the law in general, on whether, in the circumstances in which ad hoc 
revisions are being introduced by the UK and the USA, they are genuine emergency 
measures, and on whether, even if they are regarded as emergency measures, they 
are necessary or sufficient for preventing a significant loss of life. When these 
different considerations are weighed, I shall suggest, a sober Hobbesian approach is 
no more likely to vindicate (2) than a more mainstream liberalism.  
 
It is true that in unreconstructed Hobbesianism the sovereign is above the law and 
able to impose it or repeal it at will.2413 Even in that version of Hobbesianism, 
                                                        
19 The phrase ‘new normal’ is inspired by US Vice-president Dick Cheney’s claim that the steps being 
taken against counter-terrorism in the US after   a supposed period of emergency 
20 The following sixteen paragraphs are adapted from Emergencies and Politics, pp. 153-161. 
21 www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2003/threats.htm#Increased% 
20Communications%20Surveillance%20and%20Search%20and% 20Seizure%20Powers. 
22 Neil Hicks, ‘The impact of counter terror on the promotion and protection of human rights: a global 
perspective’ in R. Ashby Wilson, ed. Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), pp. 216–217. 
23 11 See J. Mayer, ‘Outsourcing torture’ New Yorker 14 February 2005. 12 Ashby Wilson, Human 
Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 215. For a perspective 
other than an AngloAmerican one, see W. Sadurski, ed Political Rights Under Stress in 21st Century 
Europe (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
24 Leviathan, ch. 26, Tuck, ed. p. 184. 14 Tuck, ed. p. 108 
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however, the sovereign is subject to the moral Law of Equity. As the ultimate judge 
of right and wrong, the sovereign falls under what Leviathan counts as the eleventh 
law of nature: . . . if a man be trusted to be judge between man and man, it is a 
precept of the Law of Nature, that he deale Equally between them. For without that, 
the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre.14 Not that this is a 
precept that the sovereign is obliged to follow in practice, if he sincerely thinks that 
his, i.e. the public’s, safety, is imperilled by doing so; the laws of nature only oblige in 
the sense of having to be given weight in foro interno, i.e., in deliberation before it 
issues in action. It may be overridden if, e.g., the agent’s life might be lost by abiding 
by it. The question is whether a breach of the law of equity can typically be sincerely 
thought to be overridden by considerations of public safety.  
 
Detention  
Many of the revised rules of detention and trial in counter-terrorism that we are 
considering deal unequally between offenders involved in terrorist action and 
people thought to be involved in highly organized violent crime or successful long-
term serial murder. But it is unclear that the danger to the public posed by these 
sorts of criminals need be greater than the danger posed by terrorism, and so it is 
unclear whether different methods of detention are necessary either. Admittedly, 
certain considerations do distinguish the cases, e.g., the greater legal difficulty in 
some terrorist cases of assembling evidence, of exposing the identities of witnesses, 
or of introducing evidence that might allow terrorists to draw inferences about the 
sources of evidence; but these are not considerations that trump a law of nature in 
unreconstructed Hobbesianism.  
 
When it comes to sober Hobbesianism, there is no presumption that the sovereign is 
above the law, and no presumption that Equity in Hobbes’s sense fails to apply. On 
the contrary, the presumption that everyone counts for one and no more than one is 
written into the exercise of democratic detached judgement that is at the heart of 
sober Hobbesianism. From the angle of sober Hobbesianism it matters that suspects 
held for having harmed or murdered or for planning to harm or murder are treated 
similarly. Departures from equity might in principle be justified if an imminent threat 
to life on a significant scale could be counteracted as a result – in short, if the 
context for the departure were an emergency situation. It is not entirely clear that 
this is the context for changes to detention rules that we are considering. The fact 
that wars are emergencies, and that ad hoc counter-terrorism procedures are 
routinely represented as belonging to an on-going ‘War on Terror’ no more 
establishes that the threshold for emergency has been met than a ‘declaration of 
war’ against gang crime would justify comparable changes to the detention and 
interrogation regime for gangs with a record of murder and assault.  
 
Again, the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy25contemplates a long-term 
effort of challenging the claims of Islamic extremists among the UK Islamic 
community so as to undercut terrorist recruitment and radicalization more 
generally; if this is an emergency measure, it is a necessarily slow-working one, and 
                                                        
25 http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy 
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one that is conducted by persuasion rather than by legislative change.26Could 
persuasion over the long term and anti-radicalization by media techniques really be 
represented as measures being adopted in an emergency? Being slow working, they 
cannot possibly be effective against an imminent threat to life. Operating as they do 
to change minds, they must be assumed to be pitched to people who are not so 
consumed by fear or distrust that they cannot be receptive to the relevant 
messages. In other words, the context for this part of the counter-terrorism strategy 
is not being assumed even by the UK government to be a state of emergency. 
Rather, it is a state of heightened public attention and willingness to express views in 
a speech setting subject to familiar liberal rules. Admittedly, the heightened public 
attention may belong to the aftermath of an emergency situation, namely the 7/7 
attacks in London in 2005, but that emergency situation was not part of a longer 
emergency that started in New York in September 2001; it was a short-lived, local 
emergency situation from which the people affected – perhaps inhabitants of 
Central London at most – subsequently returned to normal, or something close to 
normal.  
 
In claiming that the context for UK counter-terrorism strategy is not an emergency 
context, I am not in the least implying that there is no terrorist threat to worry 
about, or that it does not call for some extraordinary measures. I am claiming rather 
that it is not an emergency context in the sense of the UK being permanently on the 
verge of attack. Even the UK authorities concede variations in threat levels, not all of 
which indicate the high probability of, e.g., another 7/7 bombing. I am also claiming 
that the introduction of extraordinary measures needs justification. When 
extraordinary measures are proposed and ordinary measures might be effective, the 
onus is on a government to show that those extraordinary measures are necessary 
for the sake of preventing loss of life or other significant harm. I take this to be in the 
spirit of Hobbes on ‘good’ law. Not only must the new measures be necessary – in 
the sense that they act on a threat that the ordinary measures do not act on; they 
must indicate a route from the extraordinary back to the normal, or indicate a 
connection between the institutions for the normal administration of justice – which 
command a wide consensus – and the abnormal.  
 
Extraordinary measures can meet these conditions by being time-limited and by 
needing authorization when they are used from those who are familiar with legal 
norms for normal times and capable of judging the relative claims of security and 
liberty in particular cases. Extraordinary measures can also meet these conditions by 
passing through a legislative process in normal times in which the opinions of 
security experts and human rights defenders are given a fair hearing. These 
requirements are met more fully by UK detention and deportation regulations than 
by, e.g., ad hoc provisions in the US for the detention and trial of those once 
imprisoned at Guantanamo. In the case of Guantanamo, inmates were taken by the 
US government to have the status of military irregulars and a tribunal regime was 
                                                        
26 ‘Preventing Extremism Together’ Report of Working Groups (August 2005) 
www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/152164.pdf 
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invented for them mostly under the direction of the Executive branch,27 as opposed 
to the legislature.28The Judiciary, what is more, made a series of objections to the 
departures of this invented regime from Constitutional protections, ruling in June, 
2008 that Guantanamo detainees could challenge their imprisonment in US courts.29 
 
When it comes to the justification of the ad hoc detention measures we have been 
considering, then, we find that there is a fall at the first hurdle: that of 
demonstrating their necessity. Where there is clear evidence that some of those 
detained without charge are dangerous, that can usually be made material for a 
criminal prosecution and so for the customary detention with charges, in which case 
detention without charges is unnecessary; where there is no such evidence, on the 
other hand, and so no material for prosecution, it is hard to see what evidence for 
the need for detention there is, either. Proponents of indefinite or long detention 
without charge might have a more intelligible position if there were great 
restrictions on legally admissible evidence of the danger posed by particular terrorist 
suspects, or great legal restrictions on methods for acquiring such evidence. Then 
indefinite detention might be claimed to be necessary for eliciting, through 
confession, say, evidence that could not be obtained in any other way. Even so, the 
case for departures in counter-terrorism from the normal standards of admitting 
evidence, and normal methods of evidence gathering, seems much stronger than the 
case for departures from normal standards of detention. For one thing, violations of 
privacy are intuitively less serious than loss of liberty; for another, so long as 
surveillance is not indiscriminate and omnipresent, and so long as there are 
safeguards when a prima facie case for its use has been made, surveillance, including 
secret surveillance, seems eminently justifiable. Again, so long as admitting 
evidence, and normal methods of evidence gathering, seems much stronger than the 
case for departures from normal standards of detention. For one thing, violations of 
privacy are intuitively less serious than loss of liberty; for another, so long as 
surveillance is not indiscriminate and omnipresent, and so long as there are 
safeguards when a prima facie case for its use has been made, surveillance, including 
secret surveillance, seems eminently justifiable. Again, so long as the surveillance 
comes from sources that someone versed in normal standards of admissible 
evidence could regard as reliable, the dangers of the evidence being manufactured 




                                                        
27 For a complete survey of counter-terrorism legislation in the US as well as several Executive Orders 
dealing with Guantanamo detainees, see the heading ‘Domestic Security’ at 
www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/leg/index.html 
28 The passage of the Detainee Treatment Act (2005) introduced protections for detainees. It contains 
several loopholes, however. See www.law.harvard.edu/ 
students/orgs/hrj/iss19/suleman.shtml#Heading23 
29 For a general discussion of the role judges should have in challenging the ad hoc legislation of 
governments in alleged emergencies, see Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). For a diagnosis of some of the sources of occasional judicial timidity in this area, see 
Dyzenhaus, ‘Deference, security, and human rights’ in B. Goold and L. Lazarus, eds. Security and 
Human Rights, (Portland, OR: Hart, 2007). 
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In the UK, surveillance is of data and persons.30Communications data, ranging from 
names and addresses of registered holders of landlines and mobile telephones to 
logs of calls made, to IP addresses and registered users of email accounts, are 
available to the police if a ‘necessity’ test is passed. This means persuading ‘senior 
officers of a public authority’ that the surveillance is required. National security is 
one ground for communications data surveillance, which in many cases is personally 
authorized by the member of Cabinet in charge of the Home Office  
 
There is a wide range of further grounds for targeted surveillance,  ranging from 
‘public safety’ to tax evasion to an individual’s mental or physical health. Surveillance 
of persons can be ‘directed’ or ‘intrusive’. Directed surveillance occurs when 
suspects are followed and observed in public places by police or intelligence officers. 
Intrusive surveillance is where observation occurs in private places: homes, hotel 
rooms and cars, or where communications are intercepted, usually electronically. 
Directed surveillance requires warrants from senior police officers. These warrants 
are time limited. Intrusive surveillance is considered necessary only where those 
observed are suspected of serious crimes and the seniority of the officers whose 
authorization is required is higher than for directed surveillance. Authorizations of 
this kind are in turn reviewed by the Office of Surveillance Commissioners. Soon a 
new unified office of communications data oversight is likely to be introduced, 
providing a check on Home Office authorizations, as well as bringing together a 
plurality of existing oversight bodies. 
 
Not all surveillance evidence is legally admissible. Evidence from intercepted 
communications is not. The UK government has sometimes sought to avoid 
disclosing this evidence by introducing forms of detention and restricted movement 
that can be approved by law officers working under unusual rules. To the extent that 
the inadmissibility of  this evidence is cited as a justification for recourse to these 
new procedures, such as those associated with ‘control orders’ under the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act (2005), the inadmissibility rule seems unjustified. Perhaps it 
deserves to be abolished anyway.31 Though admitting evidence from intercepted 
communications seems to erode the sphere in which anyone at all can speak his 
mind without fear of the consequences, the hurdle that has to be crossed for the 
interception to be authorized in the first place is not low. Where the benefit of 
intruding on unguarded conversation is the prevention of a serious crime, and where 
not being able to admit such evidence contributes to an arbitrary extension of 
powers of arrest, the badness of intrusion seems heavily outweighed.32  
 
Not that privacy is of no importance. If that were so, then no hurdle at all would 
appropriately be put in the way of applying electronic intercepts, and there would 
                                                        
30 www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/surveillance/types-of-surveillance. 
31 A private member’s bill to make evidence based on intercepts admissible was introduced in the 
House of Lords in the 2006–7 Session of Parliament. For the text, see www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/pabills/200607/ interception of communications admissibility of evidence.html. The 
admissibility of intercept evidence may also be addressed in upcoming reforms of communications 
data legislation. 
32 See my ‘The Scope of Serious Crime and Preventive Justice’ forthcoming in Criminal Justice Ethics 
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indeed be an invitation to nosy officials to investigate the tax or medical records of 
people they had grudges against or were simply curious about. Nothing that has 
emerged so far justifies the warrantless wire-tapping that has sometimes gone on in 
the US since 9/11.33 But it is hard to explain or define the value of privacy entirely 
satisfactorily in legal terms,34and the right to privacy sometimes claimed by citizens 
against the state is hard to reconcile with their undeniable appetite for journalistic 
intrusions on the lives of celebrities, or voyeuristic reality television. It may also be 
inconsistent with the exhibitionism and self-advertisement associated with social 
networking internet sites.  
 
The value of privacy rises in proportion to the need to live in public, and to make 
public professions of belief or loyalty. Thus, in the China of the Cultural Revolution or 
in East Germany when the Stasi was at its strongest, the value of a sphere in which 
the unorthodox or irreverent could be spoken, or in which relationships independent 
of politics could be cultivated, would have been of the first importance.35 Where 
public standards of life penetrate even the fine detail of what one wears, whether 
one shaves, and what one reads or listens to, the value of privacy stands out very 
clearly. But where practically anything can be done publicly without anyone feeling 
embarrassed or disgusted, matters are not so straightforward. Wanting to do things 
in private can look and feel like prudery or evasiveness or snobbery; privacy can be 
seen as a cost.  
 
In between these extremes a generally valued sphere of privacy still does exist. 
Virtually everyone thinks that privacy is a requirement of romantic and family 
relationships, and such relationships seem to be highly valued universally. So if for 
no other reason than to protect these relationships, there should be a presumption 
against the violation of privacy. That said, it is hard to deny that the value of privacy 
                                                        
33 ‘Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts’ New York Times, 16 December 2005. 
www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html 
34 See Peter Galison and Martha Minow, ‘Our privacy, ourselves in an age of technological intrusions’ 
in Ashby Wilson, Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
pp. 258–294. It is important not to be misled by analogies in this area. The fact that it seems very 
undesirable to be viewable naked by others whenever they want to is not a proof that surveillance is 
highly undesirable, since (i) having one’s data accessed does not necessarily expose one very much; 
(ii) it is never supposed to be undertaken on someone else’s whim, but for the sake of some 
important benefit. The nakedness analogy is used by Lustgarten and Leigh in In From the Cold: 
National Security and Parliamentary Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 39–40. B. Goold 
argues on the strength of the analogy and on the unpleasantness of having information about one 
collected without one’s consent that ‘there is a clear relationship between privacy and the 
construction of personal identity’. See ‘Privacy, identity and security’ in B. Goold and L. Lazarus, eds. 
Security and Human Rights, (Portland, OR: Hart, 2007), p. 63. This line of thought suffers from the 
obscurity of the associated concept of  personal identity. The fact that information collected about 
me can be false and unflattering and therefore harmful to me is certainly a reason for safeguards, but 
this doesn’t change who I am. Nor does the cultivation by a person of a self-deceiving self-image 
determine who he is. Still less does the piercing of this self-image by unwanted home truths 
necessarily count as humiliation. The idea that each person should be able to project the self-image 
he likes best sounds like a spin-doctor’s charter, and not the basis for an argument, as in Goold, that 
privacy is a human right. 
35 Jung Chang, Wild Swans (London: Harper Collins, 1991); see also the film by Von Donnersmarck 
(2006), The Lives of Others. 
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can be outweighed. A terrorist who reveals his secret plans to his lover may do so in 
the context of pursuing a private or family life to which international law recognizes 
that he has a right. But if an electronic bug in his bedroom picks up the conversation 
in which the plans are revealed and the security services decide that the terrorist 
should then and there be arrested, so as to disrupt the terrorist operation and 
prevent loss of life, that seems perfectly justifiable notwithstanding the need in 
general not to penetrate the sphere of intimate relationships. The value of life 
hugely outweighs the value of privacy when they conflict. For one thing, life is a 
condition of privacy of all kinds.  
 
Surveys of public opinion – important at least for emergency measures in force in 
democracies – seem to show that where terrorism is concerned, even fairly 
indiscriminate covert access to communications and personal data is acceptable to 
citizens, at any rate in some regions of the world. A Eurobarometer study of 27000 
EU inhabitants published in February 2008 showed that 82 per cent of those 
questioned had no objection to monitoring of personal details connected to taking a 
flight, and 75 per cent were content to have all their Internet usage monitored.36 It is 
possible that people who worry about violations of privacy and security make it hard 
for surveyors to contact them, which skews the results in favour of surveillance.37 
But it is also possible that, in the popular mind, security trumps privacy where the 
two are perceived to conflict, so that laws permitting intrusion in counter-terrorism 
are legitimate.  
 
I have been concentrating on the UK. In the US, the USA/Patriot Act, introduced 
shortly after the 9/11 attacks, made it much easier for the government or the 
security services to access large data bases of, e.g., Internet providers in criminal 
investigations. Not only could data legally be monitored covertly, but there was no 
requirement to show that those whom the data concerned had committed or would 
commit a crime. Provisions so sweeping are very hard to show to be necessary, and 
so they fail even the unreconstructed Hobbesian test of ‘good law’. Similarly for the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978) under which warrantless surveillance 
went on in the US. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as amended in 2008 
introduced obstacles similar to those for intrusive surveillance in the UK when it 
comes to approval for electronic surveillance of those outside the US communicating 
with Americans: the electronic monitoring had to be of people suspected of 
involvement in terrorism. But this seems to be an afterthought, and it comes late in 
mitigating the effects of a law that is bad even by Hobbesian standards.   
 
In 2013, Edward Snowden revealed that in the US and the UK there has been large-
scale secret bulk collection of communications data, including personal 
communications data. In the United States the bulk collection is intended to identify 
the associates of individuals against which there are definite intelligence-based 
suspicions of terrorist activity. But it is know that there has also been collection of 
communications data produced by governments allied to the United States, 
                                                        
36 http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/flash/fl 225 sum en.pdf. 
37 K. Haggerty and A. Gazso, ‘The public politics of opinion research on survellance and privacy’ 
Surveillance and Society 2 (2/3) 173–180. 
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including the personal communications data of the Chancellor of Germany, Angela 
Merkel. Spying on allies raises issues of its own, but let us concentrate on bulk 
collection by government of communications data from its own citizens.  Is it, as 
some journalists have claimed,38 intrusion befitting the Stasi State? If it is that the 
conclusion bears not only on US but British practice, since GCHQ also engages in bulk 
collection on a large scale.  
 
In a sequence of other papers,39 I have claimed that bulk collection is actually less 
intrusive than more conventional surveillance technologies. This is because, being 
big data analytics, it often looks for patterns of communication at a very high level of 
generality. It starts from terrorist suspects about whom there is definite human 
intelligence, and then uses machine algorithms to identify telephone numbers linked 
to the suspect’s telephone number, sometimes at several removes. Bulk collection 
can also reveal connections  people and organizations by credit card transactions. 
Where algorithms or human analysts identify some of the links as worthy of further 
investigation, conventional investigation techniques including human surveillance, or 
targeted surveillance assisted by bugs or wiretaps are used with authorizations to 
investigate individuals further. It is at that stage that, according to me, significant 
intrusion begins. 
 
Although the NSA measures are grossly disproportionate as a means of pursuing 
terrorists, they are not necessarily intrusive in the sense of bringing human attention 
to bear on details that people would rather not have disclosed or known. The 
measures consist of “collecting everything” –collecting vast amounts of citizens’ 
communication data-- and then mining it, sifting through it with search terms--- not 
listening or looking at everything.  Since the point of mining is to get to a residue of 
the information collected that can be examined because it has met certain 
algorithmic tests of relevance, its effect is to exclude much of what is collected from 
any investigation or attention at all. “Collecting everything” does not mean looking 
into everything—except in as much as the subsequent mining engages everything in 
order to exclude a lot.  
 
Again, the purpose of the mining is not to identify the politically heterodox as in 
Stasiland, but to head off terrorist attacks. The means may be out of proportion to 
the end, but the end –preventing terrorism-- is not human-rights-violating. It is true 
that if the search terms used by the mining express some sort of discriminatory bias, 
that is a count against the mining, but this is a different ground for objection from 
privacy violation –which is what surveillance usually elicits. Again, it is true that the 
NSA has sometimes operated outside the law and without informed oversight by 
even security-cleared American politicians. That is a way of associating bulk 
collection with a democratic  deficit, but not necessarily with intrusion, still less 
intrusion comparable to Stasi intrusion. Sober Hobbesianism is able to engage with 
the objection from lack of democratic oversight. It could also engage with the 
relative ineffectivess of NSA bulk collection in finding needles in haystacks.  
                                                        
38 Reference from Loughborough presentation 
39 ‘Power and Surveillance in Democracies’, Liberal democratic regulation and technological advance’, 






Sober Hobbesianism removes some of the excesses of unreconstructed 
Hobbesianism. It is less obsessed than unreconstructed Hobbesianism with highly 
uitary government. It is less paranoid about sharp public disagreement, refusing to 
see it as war in the offing. It is friendly to democracy. It promotes not autonomy tout 
court, but only non-violently exercised autonomy. It is intolerant of fundamentalist 
attachment s and projects, because of they are  potential causes of violence. Sober 
Hobbesianism appropriates from Hobbes himself the concept of good law and often 
reaches the conclusion that legislation made ad hoc to cope with emergencies, 
especially terrorist emergencies, are not good law. Although it is less tolerant of 
fundamentalist free speech than ordinary liberalism, it does not seem to me wrong 
to be.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
